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THE REGULATION OF VENDOR CREDIT:
INCONSISTENCIES IN CALIFORNIA LAW
Reliance upon credit for the acquisition of consumer goods and services
has become an important factor in our economy. Paralleling the increase
and diversity of consumer credit, there has been an increase and diversity in
abusive practices.' Furthermore, it has been recognized that some laws
which have been applied to consumer credit transactions are inappropriate
to the requirements of contemporary conditions. 2 In response to these abuses
and anachronisms, state and federal legislatures have enacted a variety of
laws designed to inform and protect the consumer. The focus of this Com-
ment will be upon credit which is extended by a merchant under an install-
ment contract. We shall not deal specifically with revolving charge accounts
or lender credit.
In California there are two acts which pertain to vendor credit. The
broader is the Retail Installment Sales Acts (Unruh Act). This Act
applies to: 1) all goods bought for use primarily for personal, family
or household purposes4 with the exclusion of any vehicle required to
be registered under the Vehicle Code,5 and 2) services for other than
a commercial or business use.6 The narrower act is the Automobile
Sales Finance Act,7 also known as the Rees-Levering Act (RLA), which
applies to any vehicle bought primarily for personal or family purposes. 8
The purpose here is to compare the RLA with the installment sale
provisions of the Unruh Act9 and to determine how existing differences
1 See ASSEMBLY SUBCOMM. ON LENDING AND FIsCAL AGENCIES, FINAL REPORT, 15 A.
INTERvM COMm. REPORTS No. 22 (1957-59), in 2 APPENDIX TO Jour. OF THE AssEmBLY,
Reg. Sess. (1959); ASSEMBLY INTERM COMM. ON FINANCE AND INSOLVENCY, REPORT,
15 A. INTEm COMM. REPORTS No. 24 (1959-61), in 2 APPENDIX TO JOUR. OF Tim
ASSEMBLY, Reg. Sess. (1959).
2 Id.
3 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1801-12.10 (West Supp. 1969-70).
4 CAL. Crv. CODE § 1802.1 (West Supp. 1969-70).
5 Id.
6 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1802.2 (West Supp. 1969-70). This section further provides that
the services of physicians or dentists are not included.
7 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981-84.4 (West Supp. 1969-70).
8 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2981(j) (West Supp. 1969-70).
9 It is neither the intent nor within the scope of this Comment to examine the merits
of the numerous provisions of these two Acts nor to consider in detail further protections
which could be advanced. The approach adopted in this Comment is not intended to
create the impression that the Unruh Act provides the best possible in consumer credit
protection. Doubtless, the Unruh Act suffers from many shortcomings. An exhaustive
and critical analysis of the merits of the Unruh Act is to be found in Comment, Legisla-
tive Regulations of Retail Installment Financing, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 623 (1960). Not-
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will be affected by the Federal Truth in Lending Act.10 Also considered will
be the manner in which the proposed adoption of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code would affect present California legislation."'
Separate acts to protect the consumer in the purchase of goods and auto-
mobiles are not necessitated by consideration of legal rights, duties and
formalities. Rather, the distinction is artificially predicated upon the type
of item being purchased. This distinction affords the consumer less protec-
tion when purchasing an automobile than when purchasing all other chattels.
I. COMPARISON OF THE UNRUH ACT WITH THE RLA
A. Scope of application
The sale of goods' 2 and automobiles on credit is frequently accomplished
through the use of some form of an installment contract. In general, an
installment contract is an agreement between a buyer and a seller in which
the buyer agrees to pay by installments, over a specified period of time, the
purchase price of goods or the cost of services plus a service charge. The
Unruh Act refers to the type of contract covered therein, as a "retail
installment contract"'13 whereas the RLA refers to it as a "conditional sale
contract."1 4 To the extent that each Act encompasses any installment sale
contract wherein the seller has retained a security or title interest, the
terms are identical. However, the RLA embraces only those transac-
tions in which the vendor retains a security interest.15 The Unruh Act, on
the other hand, applies regardless of whether the vendor retains a security
interest in the property sold.1 6 This distinction is arguably insignificant
because vendors seldom enter into installment sales without retaining a
security interest.
B. Control of style and content
Although these Acts demand disclosure of all terms and conditions in
the installment contract, they can vary with respect to their requirements
for content and style. The contracts must be written and if printed, must
be printed in no less than eight-point type under the Unruh Act or six-
withstanding the many amendments to the Unruh Act in the nine years since this project
was published, many of the criticisms and suggestions contained therein are still valid.
10 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (Supp. IV, 1965-69).
11 The UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE is currently under study in the California
Legislature. S. Con. Res. 22, Reg. Sess. (1969); A. Con. Res. 34, Reg. Sess. (1969).
3.2 CAL. CiV. CODE § 1802.1 (West Supp. 1969-70) defines "goods" as tangible
chattels bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes, with the
exception of registered vehicles.
13 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1802.6 (West Supp. 1969-70).
14 CAL. Civ. CODE § 2981(a) (West Supp. 1969-70).
15 Id.
16 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1802.6 (West Supp. 1969-70).
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point type under the RLA.17  There appears to be no logical support for
such an inconsistency, albeit insignificant. Both Acts provide that the in-
stallment contract shall be contained in a single document encompassing the
entire agreement of the parties with respect to the costs and terms of pay-
ment, including any promissory notes or any other evidence of indebted-
ness.' Both Acts require all blank spaces to be filled in before obtaining
the buyer's signature. 10 To assure compliance the contract must contain
notice to the buyer: "1) Do not sign this agreement before you read
it or if it contains any blank space. 2) You are entitled to a completely
filled-in copy of this agreement. 3) Under the law, you have the right
to pay off in advance the full amount due and under certain conditions to
obtain a partial refund of the service charge."
'20
The requirements for the delivery of the contracts are different. 21  The
Unruh Act provides that the seller must deliver to the buyer, or mail to
him, a legible copy of the contract which complies with the Act's provisions.
Until such delivery, the buyer is obligated to pay only the cash price.22  The
RLA requires that an exact copy of the contract be furnished the buyer by the
seller at the time the buyer and the seller sign the contract or purchase order.
Furthermore, a vehicle cannot be delivered until the seller delivers a fully
executed copy of the contract to the buyer.23 Thus under the Unruh Act the
seller can deliver the goods to the buyer without first delivering a copy of the
contract to the buyer as is required by the RLA.24 It appears that the contract
delivery requirement of the RLA is a more certain method of protecting the
consumer than the corresponding provisions of the Unruh Act. Before the
consumer incurs any obligation by accepting delivery, he should be able to
verify, with a copy of the contract, that the terms of the agreement are as he
understands them to be.
C. Control over substantive terms
While both the Unruh Act and the RLA establish maximum service or fi-
17 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1803.1, 2982(a) (West Supp. 1969-70).
18 CAL. Civ. CODE 88 2982(a), 1803.2(a) (West Supp. 1969-70).
19 CAL. Civ. CODE 88 2982(a), 1803.4 (West Supp. 1969-70).
20 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1803.2(c) (West Supp. 1969-70). CAL. Civ. CODE § 2982(a)
(10) (West Supp. 1969-70) contains nearly identical language. Section 2982(a)(10)
additionally requires notice to the buyer that upon default of his obligations under the
agreement, the vehicle may be repossessed and he may be subject to suit and liability for
the unpaid indebtedness evidenced by the agreement. This provision is inapplicable
to the Unruh Act.
21 However, the acknowledgement of delivery requirements are identical. CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 1803.7, 2984.3 (West Supp. 1969-70).
22 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1803.7 (West Supp. 1969-70). The cash price is the price for
which the goods could be purchased if the sale were a sale for cash instead of a retail
installment sale. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1802.8 (West Supp. 1969-70).
23 CAL. Crv. CODE § 2982(a) (West Supp. 1969-70).
24 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1803.7, 2982(a) (West Supp. 1969-70).
[Vol. 3
COMMENTS
nance charge rates, the rates are not the same. Under the Unruh Act the
maximum service charge is set at 5/6 of 1% of so much of the initial unpaid
balance as does not exceed $1000 multiplied by the number of months
elapsing between the date of the contract and the due date of the last install-
ment. If the unpaid balance exceeds $1000, then the figure is 2/3 of 1% of
the amount over $1000, multiplied by the number of months that the contract
is scheduled to run.25 The RLA provides that the amount of the finance
charge cannot exceed 1% of the initial unpaid balance multiplied by the
number of months that the contract is scheduled to run, or $25, whichever is
greater.26 Thus if a buyer purchases furniture on an installment contract
and the unpaid balance is $3500 to be paid over a three year period, the
maximum permissible service charge is $900. If another buyer purchases
an automobile on an installment contract with the same unpaid balance and
payment period, the maximum permissible finance charge is $1260. Assum-
ing that in both instances the items purchased are sold under a similar install-
ment contract, then justification for the variation in finance charges cannot
be based on the nature of the financial arrangements. The cause for differ-
ence must be based on the fact that one case involves furniture while the
other case is concerned with automobiles. For this distinction to be valid, it
should be shown that the higher rates for financing automobiles are required
because of higher costs and greater risks; otherwise, it seems inconsistent and
inadequate to maintain different finance charges for different items where
the reason for regulating such charges is purportedly identical, viz., protection
of the consumer.
Both Acts allow the contracting parties to provide for the payment of a de-
linquency charge by the buyer on each installment in default for a period of
not less than ten days.2 7 The California Legislatire, having recognized that
unregulated charges for late payments can lead to oppressive practices,28 has
established certain maximum delinquency charges. Such charges may be
collected only once on any installment regardless of the length of the period
during which it remains in default.29  The maximum delinquency charge
25 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1805.1 (West Supp. 1969-70). Any fraction of a month in
excess of more than fifteen days can be considered as one month.
20 CAL. Civ. CODE § 2982(c) (West Supp. 1969-70). Any fraction of a month
in excess of fifteen days can be considered as one month. In terms of an annual per-
c.ntage rate, 2/3 of 1% is equal to an 8% per annum add-on rate or an actuarial rate of
14.77% per annum; 5/6 of 1% is equal to a 10% per annum add-on rate or an
actuarial rate of 18.46% per annum; 1% is equal to a 12% per annum add-on rate or
an actuarial rate of 22.15% per annum.
27 CAL. Crv. CODE H§ 2982(c), 1803.6 (West Supp. 1969-70).
28 SuDcoMm. ON LENDiNG AND FISCAL AGENCIES, FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
Examples were cited in this report in which a debtor who was six months behind in his
payments could be charged 105% of the scheduled monthly payments, so that all subse-
quent payments which he made in the scheduled amount would apply to the late charges
-4 the debt would never be extinguished.
q9 CAL. CIV. CODE H§ 2982(c), 1803.6 (West Supp. 1969-70).
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under the Unruh Act is an amount not in excess of 51% of the delinquent
payment or $5 whichever is less, provided that a minimum charge of $1
may be imposed. The RLA establishes the maximum at 5% of the amount
of the delinquent installment. If the maximum delinquency charge is im-
posed, the automobile purchaser whose payments are in excess of $100 will
incur a greater charge than the purchaser of other goods whose payments
are the same. If, however, the payments are below $100, the automobile
purchaser will incur a smaller delinquency charge.
The right of the parties to contract for the payment of the costs of collection
by the buyer is much broader in the RLA than in the Unruh Act. Under
the RLA it is simply stated that: "The contract may provide for reasonable
collection costs and fees in the event of delinquency." 30  It would appear
that the buyer could be required to pay any reasonable costs incurred in col-
lecting the installment.3 1 The Unruh Act allows the parties to contract for the
payment of any actual costs of collection provided they are reasonable and
only if occasioned by: 1) removal of the goods from the state without written
permission of the obligee,32 2) failure of the buyer to notify the obligee
of any change of residence, or 3) failure of the buyer to communicate with
the obligee for a period of forty-five days after any default in making pay-
ments.33 The language of this Section dictates that if the costs incurred in
collection are not occasioned by any of these three conditions, the buyer can-
not be bound to reimburse the obligee. Since the nature of the default and
the methods of collection are the same in both cases, it is illogical to establish
different criteria for the recovery of collection costs.
Inasmuch as the legislature decided that the limitations on the recovery
of collection costs as provided by the Unruh Act were necessary for the pro-
tection of consumers, it is reasonable to assume that the same degree of pro-
tection should be afforded the purchaser of an automobile when the under-
lying purpose of both Acts is the protection of the consumer.
A third charge may be incurred by a buyer for extending or defer-
ring payment of all or part of an installment. The Unruh Act requires
an agreement for extension or deferral to be in writing before any charge
can be made. Furthermore, such charge may not exceed an amount equal
to 1% per month simple interest on the amount of the installment(s)
extended or deferred for the period of extension or deferral.8 4 There are no
30 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2982(c) (West Supp. 1969-70).
33 There are no reported cases on this issue to date. This is understandable in
light of the small amounts likely to be involved.
32 The obligee is either the seller or his assignee.
33 CAx. CIv. CODE § 1803.6 (West Supp. 1969-70).
34 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1807.1 (West Supp. 1969-70). This Section specifies that the
period of extension or deferral shall not exceed the period from the time when such
payments would have been payable, to the date when such payments are made payable
[Vol. 3
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comparable provisions in the RLA. Since the RLA does not prohibit exten-
sions or deferrals, it seems proper to assume that such agreements may be
made and enforced. This omission of any regulation of extension or deferral
charges under the RLA is one example of how the purchaser of an automo-
bile on an installment basis is denied the same degree of protection as a
consumer making any other installment purchase.
Both Acts state that notwithstanding the provisions of any contract to the
contrary, any buyer may make payment in full at any time.35 In such event,
the buyer must receive a refund of unearned service and finance charges.8 6
The method of computing the amount to be refunded under the RLA is
slightly more advantageous to the obligee than the method specified in the
Unruh Act. Specifically, both Acts state that the refund must be at least as
great a proportion of the service charge as the amount still due under the
contract bears to the initial amount owed under the contract; however, the
RLA provides for the purpose of this computation that $25 will be subtracted
from the actual finance charge. Notwithstanding this legislative intent, the
consumer has continuously received a lesser refund by the almost universal
application of the Rule of 78. Assume that a consumer has entered into an
installment contract with the following terms: cash price of $2000, finance
charge of $250, to be paid in twenty-four equal monthly installments. If,
after the sixth payment, the consumer makes payment in full, his refund of
the unearned finance charge will be approximately $142.50 under the Unruh
Act and $128.25 under the RIA.37 The $25 deduction from the actual fi-
nance charge allowed under the RLA is purportedly intended to allow fi-
nance companies to recapture their out-of-pocket acquisition cost. It is para-
doxical, however, that the legislature has determined that such an acquisition
under the agreement. It also provides a minimum fee of $1.00 and allows for payment
by buyer of additional insurance premiums.
85 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 2982(d), 1806.3 (West Supp. 1969-70).
86 Id.
87 The Rule of 78 is referred to in 40 Op. CA. ATI'y GEN. 190 (1962). This method
allocates the greater part of the finance charge to the early period of the credit extension.
Presumably, the courts sanction this although my research has yielded no case in point.
The Rule of 78 has been subject to criticism; see Comment, Retail Installment Sales
Legislation, 58 COLUm. L. RPv. 854, 877 (1958). The sum of the digits one through
twelve (the number of months in a year) equals 78. This number is used as the
denominator of a fraction. The numerator of this fraction is the sum of the digits as-
signed to the months to be anticipated. In making this assignment, the first month of
the credit extension is given the number twelve, the second eleven, and so forth. For
a period of more than one year the sum of the digits is clearly more than 78-for two
years it is 300. The computation of the above example is as follows:
Sum of digits 1 to 24 = 300
Sum of digits assigned to months anticipated = 171
Unruh Act: 250 X 300 $142.50
171 3 $128.25
RLA: (250-25) x 171---8.2
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charge is not necessary in installment sales under the Unruh Act, yet allows
such a charge under the RLA.38
The Unruh Act also places limitations upon the use of the balloon payment
device. Any installment payment substantially in excess of prior regularly
scheduled installments is a balloon payment. The Unruh Act specifically
provides that if a buyer defaults on the payment of any installment which
is more than double the regularly scheduled payment, he is given an
absolute right to obtain a new payment schedule. Under the new schedule
the installments cannot be substantially greater than the average of the pre-
ceding installments unless the buyer agrees otherwise. 39 This Section was
undoubtedly enacted to protect the consumer, who, having made all pre-
vious payments, finds himself unable to make payment on a balloon install-
ment. The provisions of this Section recognize and alleviate the inequities
involved in a situation where a buyer defaults in making a balloon payment
after having paid substantially all of the obligation. The absence of a com-
parable provision in the RLA is indicative of an obvious neglect of the
consumer's interests in an area of recognized abuse.
In order to ensure compliance with its requirements, both Acts specifically
prohibit the inclusion of certain provisions in any installment contract.40 In-
cluded within such prohibited provisions are: 1) clauses requiring confession
of judgment, 2) clauses wherein the buyer agrees not to assert against the
seller a claim or defense arising out of a sale, and 3) clauses permitting the
seller to accelerate maturity at any time and for any reason. The provisions
prohibited are the same in both Acts with but two exceptions. The Unruh
Act specifically provides that a buyer's waiver of any of its provisions is con-
trary to public policy, thereby rendering such waiver unenforceable and
void.41 There is no such provision in the RLA. However, in light of Civ.
Code Section 3513 which states that "a law established for a public reason
cannot be contravened by a private agreement," it would appear that the
provision against waiver is not essential.42 The other exception is more sig-
nificant. The Unruh Act prohibits the inclusion in any retail installment
contract of any clause by which the buyer waives his right of action against
the seller or holder of the contract or agent for illegal acts committed in the
38 Any argument on the assumption that costs are greater in connection with auto-
mobile financing than with other chattels would seem to be erroneous, as it could be
argued that this factor is already reflected in the higher finance charges permitted under
the RLA.
39 CAL. Crv. CODE § 1807.3 (West Supp. 1969-70).
40 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2983.7, 1804.1 (West Supp. 1969-70).
41 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1801.1 (West Supp. 1969-70).
42 It has been held that for purposes of CAL. Civ. CODE § 3513 (West 1954),
a law is enacted for a public reason if its protections extend to the public generally and
promote the welfare of the general public rather than a small percentage of citizens.
Benane v. International Harvester Co., 142 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 874, 299 P.2d 750
(1956). It is unquestionable that the RLA conforms to these requirements.
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repossession of goods. 43 The absence of a comparable restriction in the RLA
highlights another disparity between the RLA and the Unruh Act.
D. Regulation of the rights of the parties to an installment contract
In many instances the vendor will sell his interest in an installment contract
to a finance agency or other assignee. 44 It thus becomes important to deter-
mine how such a sale affects the rights of the buyer. Section 1804.2 of the
Unruh Act and Section 2983.5 of the RLA deal with the buyer's rights upon
assignment of the contract. Analysis and comparison of the language of these
two statutes reveal their inconsistency. The RLA provision does not en-
large the rights of the buyer to the same degree as does the corresponding Sec-
tion of the Unruh Act. Under Section 1804.2 of the Unruh Act an assignee
is subject to all claims and defenses of the buyer against the seller, with but
two limitations: 1) the buyer's rights may only be asserted as a defense,
and 2) the assignee's liability is limited to the amount of the debt still owing.
Under the RLA the right to assert certain claims and defenses against an
assignee depends upon when they arise. Because Section 2983.5 does not
modify or restrict Civ. Code Section 1459 or Code Civ. Proc. Section 368, 45
rights which the buyer has against the seller at the time of notification of
assignment appear to be assertable against the assignee at any time. As to
those claims or defenses which arise subsequent to notification of assignment,
they too can be asserted against the assignee but only if the assignee is in-
formed in writing, within fifteen days of the notice of assignment, of facts
giving rise to such claim or defense. If the basis for a claim or defense first
appears subsequent to the fifteen day period, it cannot be asserted against the
assignee. In most instances the seller will assign the contract on the same
day as the sale or shortly thereafter. Thus, assuming prompt notice of as-
signment, any claim or defense which may arise subsequent to fifteen days
after the sale could not be asserted against the assignee under the RLA,
whereas, it could be asserted under the Unruh Act.
Prior to 1967, Section 1804.246 of the Unruh Act contained language
nearly identical with the fifteen day notice of claim language of Section 2983.5
of the RLA. In 1967, Section 1804.2 was amended to eliminate this fifteen
day notice of claim language.4 7 This change is an acknowledgment of the in-
equities resulting from such a restrictive provision.
43 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1804.1(e) (West Supp. 1969-70).
44 CA]L. CIV. CODE § 1809.1 (West Supp. 1969-70) provides that a financing agency
may purchase a retail installment contract from a seller on such terms and conditions
and for such price as may be mutually agreed upon.
45 CAL. Crv. CODE § 1459 (West 1954) and CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 368 (West 1954)
state that an assignment is subject to the equities and defenses existing in favor of the
obligor at the time of the assignment or notice thereof.
46 Ch. 201, [19591 Cal. Stat. 2098.
47 Ch. 1294, 1967] Cal. Stat. 3098.
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These Acts allow for the retention of a security interest and for the right of
the seller to repossess. Additionally, both Acts establish several limitations
and requirements with regard to repossession. Section 1812.2 of the Unruh
Act provides that within ten days after repossessing, the seller must give
notice to the buyer of his intention to sell the goods at public sale or give
notice of his intention to retain the goods in satisfaction of the balance due.
This notice must inform the buyer of how much must be paid in order to
redeem the goods. Furthermore, the buyer has an absolute right to redeem
within ten days of the notice if he pays the proper amount. If the seller
intends to sell the goods, then the buyer has the right to redeem at any time
prior to the actual sale.
Section 2983.2 of the RLA requires the seller to give the buyer at least
ten days written notice of his intent to sell the repossessed vehicle. He must
also inform the buyer of his right to redeem the vehicle and the total amount
required to do so. In contrast to the Unruh Act, the RLA does not spe-
cifically prescribe the period after repossession in which notice of intent to
sell must be given. However, Section 2983.2 bars the seller from recovering
a deficiency judgment if he fails to give such notice within sixty days of re-
possession. The practical effect of this, in light of the high incidence of de-
ficiencies after sale, is to compel the seller to give notice within sixty days
of repossession. Hence, under the Unruh Act notice of intent to sell or
retain the goods must be given within ten days of repossession, whereas the
RLA allows the seller sixty days to give notice. From the language of Section
2983.2 it appears that the seller need not notify the buyer of his intent to keep
the vehicle in satisfaction of the balance due; furthermore, it appears that
under this section the buyer does not have a right of redemption if the seller
decides not to resell the vehicle. These variations between the two Acts
regarding requirements of notice and right of redemption are arbitrary and
can inflict harsh injustices upon the automobile purchaser, injustices which
are prohibited under the Unruh Act. Notwithstanding the possible conten-
tion that in nearly all instances the repossessor of an automobile will resell the
vehicle, there is, nonetheless, a possibility that there will be a retention
rather than a resale; to this extent, the RLA is deficient in its purported
attempt to protect the consumer. This is especially poignant in those in-
stances where the buyer has paid a substantial amount of the contract bal-
ance.
Closely related to the right of repossession and resale is the right of the
seller to recover a deficiency judgment where the proceeds of the resale are
insufficient to cover: 1) the expense of the resale, 2) the expense of the
retaking, repairing and storing of the goods, and 3) the satisfaction of the
balance due under the contract. Section 1812.5 of the Unruh Act ex-
plicitly precludes the obligee from ever recovering a deficiency judgment.
This provision is manifestly indicative of the legislature's determination that
such a prohibition is essential to the adequate protection of the consumer.
[Vol. 3
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Once again, a provision which has been deemed essential to consumer pro-
tection has been omitted from the RLA. In fact, the RLA specifically pro-
vides that if, within sixty days after repossession, the seller notifies the buyer
of his intent to resell, then the seller or other obligee may recover a deficiency
judgment.48 Inasmuch as the stated objectives of the two acts are identical,
this glaring inconsistency seems completely without justification. If the buyer
of furniture or appliances is to be protected against deficiency judgments,
why not afford the buyer of an automobile the same degree of protec-
tion? The nature of the financial arrangements is often identical and the
amount of money at stake in the first instance is often as great as is in-
volved in the purchase of an automobile.
In a further effort to protect the defaulting buyer, the legislature, in the
Unruh Act, has provided that in addition to exemptions provided elsewhere,
the wages of a defendant are exempt from attachment for a period of sixty
days from the date of default.49  Again, there is no comparable provision
in the RLA, but this inconsistency may be resolved under Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.50 In Sniadach, the Court held unconstitutional, as a denial
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, a Wisconsin statute au-
thorizing prejudgment garnishment of wages.
E. Sanctions imposed for violation
Both Acts establish different criteria for the correction of violations. 51
They provide that correction shall be made by delivering a properly revised
copy of the contract to the buyer, that any amount improperly collected shall
be credited against the indebtedness, and that any correction which increases
the amount owed by the buyer is not effective unless the buyer concurs in
writing. The seller's right to correct violations is more narrow under the
Unruh Act. Whereas willful violations are deemed incorrectible under the
Unruh Act, the RLA allows for corrections only if they appear on the face
of the contract and are effected within thirty days of the execution of the
contract. Moreover, the language of the Unruh Act indicates that corrections
of non-willful violations must be made, if at all, within thirty days of the
execution of the original contract. The RLA prescribes no time limitation
for the correction of nonwillful violations.
Paradoxically the RLA imposes harsher civil sanctions upon violators
of its provisions than does the Unruh Act. The application and degree
48 CAL. Civ. CODE § 2983.2 (West Supp. 1969-70). Additional prerequisites to the
recovery of a deficiency judgment are notice to the buyer that he is subject to suit and
liability for any deficiency which exists after resale and an itemization of all amounts
due including any credits for unearned finance charges or cancelled insurance.
49 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1812.1 (West Supp. 1969-70).
50 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
51 CAL. CIrv. CODE §§ 2984, 1812.8 (West Supp. 1969-70).
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of the civil penalties imposed by the RLA is rather complex. 2 If the seller,
except as a result of a bona fide error in computation, violates either the
provisions regarding disclosure or maximum charges, the contract will, at
the election of the buyer, be unenforceable by the seller. The buyer may,
with reasonable diligence, elect to rescind the contract and, upon return of
the vehicle, may recover all payments made pursuant to the contract, in-
cluding the value of any trade-in as it appears on the conditional sale contract,
or the fair market value at the time the contract was made, whichever is
greater. If the seller has assigned the contract and if the assignee has
knowledge of the violation, then the buyer may still elect to rescind and return
the vehicle and recover from the seller all payments made to the seller and
the assignee.53 The possibility that the seller will have to return all amounts
paid by the buyer is a compelling reason for compliance, especially when
in most instances the seller assigns the contract at a discounted rate to a
finance company. However, if the assignee does not have actual knowledge
of the violation by the seller of the disclosure or maximum charges regula-
tions, the contract will be valid and enforceable, although the buyer will be
excused from payment of the unpaid finance charge.
5 4
If a seller or assignee, except as a result of a bona fide error, violates the
prepayment and refund provisions, "the buyer may recover from such person
three times the amount of any finance charge paid to that person."55  By
variegating the penalties for different violations, the RLA has rendered cer-
tain of its provisions more coercive than others.
If a seller fails to comply with the provisions of the Unruh Act, he or any-
one who acquires the contract from him with knowledge of the noncompli-
ance is barred from recovery of any charges in excess of the cash price, and
the buyer can recover all of such charges which he has paid.60 Thus if the
seller has not assigned the contract, he will be subject to this penalty even if
the violation was an innocent error, whereas the assignee will be subject to
the sanction only if he had knowledge of the noncompliance.
II. EFFECT OF THE FTLA AND UCCC ON RECONCILING THE DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE UNRUH ACT AND THE RLA
In an attempt to arrest the mounting abuses in consumer credit throughout
the nation, Congress recently enacted the Consumer Credit Protection Act
52 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 2983, 2983.1 (West Supp. 1969-70).
53 If the seller goes out of business can the buyer recover from an assignee of the
seller? This question has not been resolved.
54 It has been held that an assignee cannot claim that he has no notice of violation
where the violation appears on the face of the contract in the form of a failure to de-
scribe and itemize certain amounts. G.M.A.C. v. Kyle, 54 Cal. 2d 101, 108, 4 Cal. Rptr.
496, 500 (1960).
55 CAL. Civ. CODE § 2983.1 (West Supp. 1969-70).
56 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1812.7 (West Supp. 1969-70).
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(CCPA).5r7 This Act, generally referred to as the Federal Truth in Lending
Act (FTLA), became effective, in part, on July 1, 1969 and will become
fully effective in July 1971. All businesses and financial institutions involved
in consumer credit are covered by the FTLA. The Act is specifically di-
rected toward securing a "meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit." 58 The scope of
the FTLA is not so broad as that of the two California Acts because the
FTLA attempts neither to regulate maximum finance charges nor to define
the rights and duties of the parties. Because of this emphasis on disclosure-
a subject about which the provisions of the RLA and Unruh Act are nearly
identical-the FTLA will have no effect upon reconciling the differences
between the Unruh Act and the RLA.
There are, however, two provisions in the FTLA, not in the area of dis-
closure, which will augment consumer credit protection in California. A sec-
tion of the FTLA establishes a limited right of rescission by the obligor in any
credit transaction in which a security interest is retained in the obligor's resi-
dence.59 With respect to garnishment of wages, the FTLA establishes maxi-
mum amounts which can be garnisheed. 60 This limitation is more stringent
than the California limitations on garnishment. 1 Furthermore, another sec-
tion prohibits employers from discharging any employee because his wages
have been subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness.6 2 It should be
noted that these sections, as they relate to prejudgment garnishment, would
appear to have been superseded by Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.6 3
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has
recently promulgated a Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC). The
purpose of this Code is to establish a comprehensive statute regulating vir-
tually all aspects of consumer credit. The UCCC was drafted with the intent
of incorporating the FTLA into its provisions.6 4 Consideration of the effect
which the UCCC has upon reconciliation of the differences between the Un-
ruh Act and the RLA is extremely pertinent as the California legislature is
currently studying the UCCC for possible adoption.65 The UCCC applies
57 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et. seq. (Supp. IV, 1965-69).
58 Id. at § 1601.
9 Id. at § 1635.
60 Id. at § 1673.
01 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 543 (West 1954).
62 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S C. § 1674 (Supp. IV, 1965-69).
63 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
04 See Jordan & Warren, Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. Rnv.
387 (1968).
65 Concurrent resolutions have been introduced in the California Senate and Assem-
bly calling for study of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, S. Con. Res. 22, Reg.
Sess. (1969); A. Con. Res. 34, Reg. Sess. (1969). The Uniform Consumer Credit
Code has been adopted in Utah and Oklahoma. UTAH CODE ANN., Title 70B
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to the purchase of all consumer goods on credit with no distinctions drawn
between the purchase of automobiles and other goods and services.
A. Scope of application
The UCCC is broader in scope than the RLA and parallels the scope of the
Unruh Act. As indicated previously, the RLA applies only to installment
sales in which the seller retains a security interest, while the Unruh Act is not
so limited. UCCC Article 2 relating to Credit Sales would apply to any con-
sumer credit sale where the debt is payable in installments or a credit service
charge is made and the amount financed does not exceed $25,000 (except in
the case of a sale of real estate); thus the UCCC, as does the Unruh Act,
would apply regardless of whether the seller retained a security interest.
B. Control of style and content
The approach of the RLA to the issue of delivery of the contract appears
to be adopted by the UCCC. There is no specific language in the UCCC
which is comparable to the relevant language of Section 2982(a) of the RLA;
however, UCCC Section 2.302(2) (b) can be construed as requiring that
the contract must be delivered to the buyer at the time that it is signed. The
UCCC does not state, as does the RLA, that the seller cannot make
delivery until the buyer receives a copy of the contract.
C. Control over substantive terms
The UCCC, in contrast to the varying rates established by the Unruh Act
and RLA, provides uniform maximum finance charges for all goods. How-
ever, as the rates specified in the UCCC are substantially greater than those
which are currently permitted in California, it is unlikely that the UCCC rate
structure would be enacted in California.00 Nevertheless, the concept
of a uniform reasonable maximum rate structure for all goods and services,
including automobiles, is entirely consistent with the goal of adequate con-
sumer protection and, as indicated previously, is highly desirable.
§§ 70B-1-101 to 70B-9-103 (Smith Supp. 1969); 14A OKLA. STATS. ANN. §§ 1-101 to
9-103 (West Supp. 1969-70).
6 "The credit service charge .. on credit sale other than pursuant to a revolving
charge account ... may not exceed the equivalent of the greater of either of the fol-
lowing:
(a) the total of
(i) 36 per cent per year on that part of the unpaid balances of the amount
financed which is $300 or less;
(ii) 21 per cent per year on that part of the unpaid balances of the amount
financed which is more than $300 but does not exceed $1,000; and
(iii) 15 per cent per year on that part of the unpaid balances of the amount
financed which is more than $1,000; or
(b) 18 per cent per year on the unpaid balances of the amount financed.
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDrr CODE § 2.201.
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The UCCC sets a maximum delinquency charge not to exceed the
greater of 5% of the unpaid installment up to a maximum of $5, or the
deferral charge that would be permitted to defer the unpaid amount of the
installment for the period that it is delinquent. 67 Both California Acts specify
a maximum rate of 5%, with the Unruh Act also setting a $5 maximum.
This UCCC Section is centered between the provisions of the two California
Acts.
The UCCC does not contain any provision regulating the payment of
the collection costs by the buyer.
With the exception of a different rate, the UCCC's regulation of deferral
charges is quite similar to the deferral provision of the Unruh Act.68
The UCCC provides the same method for computing the refund of un-
earned service charges as does the Unruh Act.69 Thus the variation in
computational method existing between the Unruh Act and the RLA would
be resolved by the UCCC along the lines of the Unruh Act. Also, while both
California Acts give the buyer an absolute right to make prepayment, there is
no comparable provision in the UCCC.
The absence of any provision in the RLA relating to balloon payments
would be resolved by the UCCC, as Section 2.405 is substantially the same
as the Unruh Act provision on balloon payments.
D. Regulation of the rights of the parties to an installment contract
Regarding the rights of a buyer against an assignee, the UCCC has
adopted two alternative sections. The language of UCCC Section 2.404
(Alternative A) is nearly identical with the language of Section 1804.2 of the
Unruh Act concerning buyer's rights against the assignee. UCCC Section
2.404 (Alternative B) takes the same approach as Section 2983.5 of the
RLA. If either alternative is adopted, the inconsistencies in current California
law would be eliminated. Adoption of Alternative A would more closely con-
form to the current desire to provide adequate consumer protection as evi-
denced by the 1967 amendment of Section 1804.2 of the Unruh Act to its
current language.
The distinctions which exist between the two California Acts on reposses-
sion and right of redemption would not be affected by the UCCC because it
contains no provisions relating to these rights.
As noted, the two California Acts differ with regard to the obligee's
right to recover a deficiency judgment. The provisions of the UCCC
represent something of a compromise between the outright denial of such a
67 UNn'oRm CONSUMER CREDrr CODE § 2.203(1).
68 Id. at § 2.204; CAL. Civ. CODE § 1807.1 (West Supp. 1969-70).
69 UNIFoI CONSUMER CREDrr CODE § 2.210; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1806.3 (West Supp.
1969-70).
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right in the Unruh Act and the unrestricted acceptance of such a right in the
RLA. The UCCC confines the obligee's right to a deficiency judgment to
instances where the cash price of the goods repossessed is over $1000. 70
The garnishment sections of the UCCC are more restrictive than those
found in the Unruh Act. Section 5.104 states that a debtor's unpaid earnings
cannot be attached prior to entry of judgment in an action against the
debtor.7 1 Furthermore, Section 5.105 places a restriction on the amount of
earnings which can be attached. This section is more restrictive than the
comparable section of the FTLA.72 Perhaps the most significant addition
to the restrictions on garnishment is contained in Section 5.106 which pro-
hibits an employer from discharging an employee for the reason that a creditor
of the employee has attached his wages, regardless of the number of times
that such attachment occurs. 7
3
Incorporated in the UCCC are a number of sections which provide for a
"cooling-off period" with respect to home solicitations. 74 Section 2.502 pro-
vides that, until midnight of the third business day after an agreement has
been signed, the buyer has the right to cancel any home solicitation credit
sale of consumer credit goods. It is the intent to neutralize high pressure sales
tactics which has prompted this provision.75 Door-to-door salesmen are often
able to induce consumers to make hasty and ill-advised purchases. 70 If,
after a salesman has departed, the buyer "cools off" and realizes that he has
been pressured into an unwise purchase, the UCCC allows him to cancel the
sale. If this provision of the UCCC is enacted, it would add a new dimension
to the protections afforded by the Unruh Act. Indeed, similar cooling-off
period legislation has on several occasions been proposed in the California
Legislature.77
E. Sanctions imposed for violations
The UCCC and the RLA vary the penalties for the violation of differ-
ent sections. Where the buyer has been charged in excess of permissible
rates, he has a right to recover a refund from the seller or his assignee in the
70 UNIFOR-M CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.103.
71 This section appears to be in harmony with Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
72 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. IV, 1965-69).
73 This provision is more forceful than Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674
(Supp. IV, 1965-69).
74 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2.501-05.
75 Id. at § 2.501, Comment.
76 See Sher, The "Cooling-Off' Period in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
717 (1968).
77 A.B. 209 (Reg. Sess. 1967), A.B. 213 (Reg. Sess. 1968). "Cooling-off' period




form of a deduction from the outstanding indebtedness3 8 This penalty is
less severe than the penalties imposed by the two California Acts for the
same violation3 9 Where there is a violation of the disclosure provisions of
the UCCC, the violator is liable to the buyer in an amount equal to twice
the amount of the service charge, but not less than $100 or more than $1,000
plus the costs of the action and reasonable attorney's fees.80 If the creditor
corrects the violation of the disclosure provisions within fifteen days after dis-
covering an error, the creditor will incur no liability for the violation.81 The
language of this Section seemingly prohibits the correction of an intentional
violation because the seller must "discover" the error. Where the creditor
can show that the violation was unintentional and resulted from a bona fide
error, he will incur no liability for failure to make full disclosure. The civil
penalty provisions of the UCCC are somewhat similar to the provisions of
both California Acts. While adoption of the UCCC's penalty provisions
would achieve uniformity, it is questionable whether the consumer would
be as adequately protected through private remedies as he is under California
law.
There is, however, a consumer oriented penalty and enforcement section
in the UCCC which requires the establishment of an Administrator with
power, inter alia, to "receive and act on complaints, take action designed to
obtain voluntary compliance with this Act, or commence proceedings on his
own initiative .... "82
Section 6.108 confers upon the Administrator authority to issue cease
and desist orders against persons who violate provisions of the Act.8 Such
orders are not enforceable until the Administrator secures a judicial enforce-
ment order. However, unless the alleged violator files a petition for judicial
review of the cease and desist order within thirty days after receipt thereof, it
becomes final and the Administrator may obtain enforcement without having
to support his findings with substantial evidence. Alternatively, Section 6.110
authorizes the administrator to seek injunctions to restrain violations of the
Act.
In Section 6.111 the Administrator is empowered to bring civil actions to
restrain a creditor or person acting on his behalf from making or enforcing
unconscionable contracts, from unconscionably inducing consumers to enter
into credit transactions or from fraudulently or unconscionably collecting con-
sumer credit debts. The following factors are to be considered in applying
78 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.202.
79 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2983.1, 1812.7 (West Supp. 1969-70).
80 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.203(1).
81 Id. at § 5.203(2).
82 Id. at § 6.104(1)(a).
83 Such orders are not available for violations of the unconscionabiity or fraudulent
conduct rules set out in UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 6.111. This section pre-
scribed its own means of enforcement.
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this section:
(3) ... :
(a) belief by the creditor at the time consumer credit sales ...are made that
there was no reasonable probability of payment in full ...;
(b) ...knowledge by the seller.. . at the time of the sale. . . of the inability
of the buyer. . . to receive substantial benefits from the property or services
sold...;
(c) ...gross disparity between the price of the property or services sold ...
and the value of the property or services measured by the price at which
similar property or services are readily obtainable in credit transactions by
like buyers. .
(d) . .. ;and
(e) the fact that the respondent has knowingly taken advantage of the inability
of the debtor reasonably to protect his interests by reason of physical or
mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to understand the language
of the agreement, or similar factors.84
The Administrator is enabled under Section 6.111 to deal with new pat-
terns of fraudulent or unconscionable conduct and to impose flexible reme-
dies for halting reprehensible creditor practices. sY This Section is potentially
responsive to the needs of consumers. Of course, realization of its full poten-
tial would require an aggressive Administrator.
When a creditor makes or collects charges in excess of those permitted in
the Act, Section 6.113(1) empowers the Administrator to bring a civil
action to refund the amount of the excess. A penalty may be imposed if such
excess charge is a deliberate violation or made in reckless disregard of the
Act, or if the creditor has refused to make a refund within a reasonable time
after demand by the debtor or Administrator. Such penalty cannot exceed
the greater of either the amount of the credit service charge or ten times
the excess charge. Since individual excess charges are usually relatively
small amounts, this section enables the Administrator to file such actions on
behalf of more than one debtor.
Section 6.113(2) provides that, except for making unconscionable agree-
ments or engaging in a course of fraudulent or unconscionable conduct, the
Administrator may bring a civil action to impose a civil penalty of up to
$5,000 upon a creditor who has engaged in a course of repeated and willful
violations of the Act.
ll. CONCLUSION
Full and adequate protection of the consumer in all his encounters with
installment sellers should be sought. In California, in the area of vendor
credit, the purchaser of a motor vehicle receives less protection than the pur-
chaser of all other goods and services. The FTLA has no impact upon the
need to reconcile the RLA with the Unruh Act. Adoption of the UCCC,
84 UNn mOl CoNsumER Cnfrr CoDE § 6.111.
85 Id. at Comment 2.
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which would apply uniformly to all consumer credit transactions, necessarily
supersedes the RLA and the Unruh Act. An overall assessment of the
UCCC reveals it as generally less protective of the interests of vendor
credit purchasers than the Unruh Act.
While the concept of uniformity in the area of consumer credit is logical
and beneficial, the California Legislature should consider alternatives to the
adoption of the UCCC. One such alternative is to expand the Unruh Act
to include motor vehicles and to repeal the RLA. Those provisions of the
RLA which are appropriate to the installment purchasing of motor vehicles
and those which are more promotive of consumer interests than corre-
sponding sections of the Unruh Act could be integrated into the Unruh
Act. Additionally, to supplement consumer credit protection, the Unruh Act
should be amended to include provisions for a cooling-off period and for a
scheme of public enforcement by an Administrator similar to such provisions
contained in the UCCC.
By expanding the Unruh Act to cover all vendor credit and enacting these
two provisions of the UCCC, both greater uniformity and better consumer
protection could be attained in California.
Richard D. Sommers
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